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This study provides key insights for the 
development of incentive-based conservation 
schemes for hilsa in Myanmar’s Ayeyarwady 
Delta. The results of a choice experiment 
suggest on average a willingness to participate 
in such conservation schemes. Some potential 
management options for conservation schemes 
such as additional closed fishing periods and 
creation of new sanctuaries are more widely 
accepted than restrictions in net use. We 
recommend further studies to refine management 
options and identify appropriate compensation 
mechanisms that take into account improved 
ecological knowledge and carefully consider 
income dependencies and gender disparities along 
the supply chain. 
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Summary
Hilsa fishing serves as an important resource to fishers 
in Myanmar’s Ayeyarwady Delta where hilsa shad’s 
spawning and nursing grounds are located, serving 
local needs and a national market. There are growing 
concerns regarding the sustainability of Myanmar’s hilsa 
fishery. Primary factors believed to contribute to this 
trend include overfishing, often with small-mesh nets, 
and habitat destruction; with water pollution and climate 
change exacerbating the problem (Khaing et al., 2018).
Policy options to improve the sustainability of hilsa 
fishing in Myanmar include incentive-based conservation 
schemes. These bear some similarity to ‘payments for 
ecosystem services’ schemes, which are voluntary 
transactions between ecosystem service beneficiaries 
and ecosystem service suppliers that are in the best 
interest of both parties. However, incentive-based 
schemes may be developed with the aim of providing 
economic incentives for abiding by existing and new 
fishing regulations. 
Among the methodological tools available to assess 
attitudes and preferences of potential participants in 
incentive-based schemes, ‘choice experiments’ are 
increasingly used. Choice experiments are a survey-
based stated preference method to find respondents’ 
preferences between various alternatives, such as 
hypothetical conservation agreements, through which 
participants agree to undertake changes in resource 
management that benefit conservation in return for 
some compensation. This report summarises the results 
from a choice experiment study conducted with fishing 
communities in four townships within the Ayeyarwady 
Delta region of Myanmar as part of an effort to identify 
opportunities for incentive-based schemes for the 
conservation of hilsa shad fisheries. The research 
was undertaken as part of the Darwin-HilsaMM project 
Carrots and Sticks: Incentives to conserve hilsa fish 
in Myanmar. 
The hypothetical conservation agreements offered to 
respondents in the choice experiment included three 
aspects related to hilsa management and two aspects 
that characterised monetary and in-kind compensation: 
1) a new fishing ban that would last for seven days in 
one, two, or three months in the period from October 
to December; 2) new sanctuary spaces for juvenile 
hilsa that would be placed every 9, 6 or 3 miles for a 
maximum length of 1 mile along the river, with a width 
of up to half the river; 3) requiring fishers to use nets 
distributed by the Department of Fisheries with a 
4.5 inch mesh from October to December and a ban 
on all other nets; 4) monetary compensation, with cash 
payments to range from MMK 75,000 to 350,000 (US$ 
53 to 248); and 5) rice as in-kind compensation, in 
amounts of one, two or three tinn (a Myanmar measure 
of volume commonly used for rice). Payments of both 
rice and money were to be made as one-off annual 
payments and management changes would be agreed 
through written agreements between fishers and the 
Department of Fisheries. A total of 381 respondents 
were surveyed during July, October and November 2019 
in four townships of the Ayeyerwady Delta: Ngapudaw, 
Maubin, Mawlamyinegyun and Labutta. Where possible, 
respondents were chosen to overlap with households 
that had participated in a previous socioeconomic 
household survey conducted in April 2018 (Khaing 
et al., 2018).
The results of this choice experiment provide some 
important insights for the development of incentive-
based conservation schemes for hilsa shad in Myanmar. 
On average, respondents showed a tendency to choose 
one of two alternatives representing conservation 
agreements rather than the ‘No agreement’ alternative. 
This indicates a general willingness to participate in 
this type of conservation scheme, especially given the 
low rate of ‘No agreement’ choices; however, such an 
interpretation should be carefully assessed against the 
presence of cultural norms, such as cultural ways of 
expressing consent or dissent.
In terms of the specific proposals for more sustainable 
hilsa management, the results show that both additional 
closed periods to facilitate spawning and the creation 
of new sanctuaries are the most widely accepted 
management changes. On the other hand, restrictions 
on net type requiring a larger mesh size (to allow 
more juveniles to mature) were perceived as most 
controversial. Creating additional periods when fishing 
is banned are likely to be more acceptable if they are 
around the main festival in October (Thadingyut). 
Additional closures in November and December 
(Tazaungmon and Natdaw) are likely to require higher 
compensation. The creation of new sanctuaries is 
particularly acceptable when sanctuaries are spaced 
at least six miles apart. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
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that many fishers are already aware of areas closed off 
to fishing, including conservation zones. Therefore, it 
may be possible to implement this change without the 
need for much compensation. However, this needs to 
be tested further, based on what experience fishers 
have of current conservation zones and the benefits and 
risks of implementing and managing sanctuary areas. 
Fishers showed the greatest demand for compensation 
if net use restrictions were to form part of conservation 
agreements. While changes in net use may be effective 
in terms of hilsa conservation, this option should be 
carefully evaluated to better understand the implications 
in terms of enforcement, markets for fishing gear and 
livelihoods along the supply chain.
There was limited interest in the offer of in-kind 
compensation in the form of rice. While the region’s 
abundant supply of rice may partly explain this result, 
a more detailed exploration of this finding could find 
out if other forms of in-kind compensation are more 
viable. Where this includes food items, it may be worth 
moving beyond staple food items towards items that 
are perceived to be nutritious and difficult to obtain in 
local markets.
Breaking down the results by township shows some 
variations in preferences. For example, in Ngawpudaw 
respondents did not pay much attention to in-kind or 
monetary compensation; their earnings from fishing are 
reported to exceed the amounts offered to compensate 
for fishing restrictions. For management changes, the 
results show that fishers were most concerned about 
restricting net use; that they could accept a fishing ban 
in the month of October but not in other months; and 
that they are indifferent to sanctuary areas which are 
less close together, at every 6 or 9 miles of river length. 
Results are qualitatively similar for Mawlamyinekyun, 
Labutta and Maubin townships, except for the fact 
that respondents were on average more responsive to 
changes in monetary compensation offered. 
Model results based on gender show that apart from 
changes in nets, female respondents were indifferent to 
management changes. This is likely due to the disparity 
of labour practices between men and women within 
the fish supply chain. While women in the villages tend 
to be more engaged in repairing nets and selling fish, 
men are more likely to engage in fishing and boat repair 
(Khaing et al., 2018). 
These findings reveal a number of promising 
management options to pursue further. Building on this 
study and improved ecological knowledge (Bladon 
et al., 2019), we recommend further research to 
refine potential management changes and to identify 
appropriate compensation amounts. This should also 
carefully consider income from fishery and income 
dependency over the season and provide additional 
insights into different gender perspectives on incentive-
based conservation schemes. Deliberative methods may 
be particularly helpful, especially if focused on finding 
a ‘fair price’ for compensation and engaging fishers in 
conservation efforts. 
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1 
Introduction
Hilsa shad (Tenualosa ilisha, known locally as Nga Tha 
Lauk) is a species of fish found commonly in the Bay of 
Bengal and surrounding waters. Myanmar is reported 
to account for 25% of global hilsa catch (Dewhurst-
Richman et al., 2016). Hilsa fishing is common both 
in marine and inland fisheries. The fish travels from 
marine waters to freshwater rivers for spawning. Bladon 
et al. (2019) indicate that August to September is 
the main spawning season in the Ayeyarwady Delta, 
with additional spawning seasons likely to take place 
in January to February and April to May. Immature 
individuals also migrate between marine and freshwater 
environments (Rahman et al., 2008). Hilsa fishing 
serves as an important resource to fishers in Myanmar, 
particularly along the Ayeyarwady Delta, where their 
spawning and nursing grounds are located. Hilsa fishing 
contributes greatly to both the fish markets in Myanmar 
and to subsistence fishing. Overall in Myanmar, fish 
contributes 20% of household protein intake, with 
higher contributions in the Ayeyarwady region (Belton 
et al., 2015), and is mostly small scale, with 87% of 
registered fishing vessels reported as ‘small’ fishing 
boats (DoF, 2018; Khaing et al., 2018). Especially in the 
Ayeyarwady region, many small-scale fishers rely heavily 
on hilsa catch for their income (Soe et al., 2018).
1.1 The sustainability of 
hilsa fishing
There are growing concerns regarding the sustainability 
of Myanmar’s hilsa fishery. While the total life span 
of hilsa is up to six years, most hilsa are caught at 
two years or younger (Hossain et al., 2019). This 
trend is likely due to recent high levels of exploitation. 
Exploitation rates (the proportion of mortality caused 
by fishing) have increased significantly from 0.37 to 
0.81 since 2012 (Hossain et al., 2019). Primary factors 
believed to contribute to this trend include overfishing, 
the use of small-mesh nets and habitat destruction, with 
water pollution and climate change exacerbating the 
problem (Khaing et al., 2018).
Policy options to improve the sustainability of 
hilsa fishing in Myanmar include incentive-based 
conservation schemes. These are similar to ‘payments 
for ecosystem services’ schemes, which are voluntary 
transactions between ecosystem service beneficiaries 
and ecosystem service suppliers that are in the best 
interest of both parties. However, instead of relying 
entirely on voluntary participation, schemes may 
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provide economic incentives for abiding by existing 
and new fishing regulations; the compensation of 
losses due to regulatory measures are expected to 
be more cost-effective and acceptable than enforcing 
those measures. The government of Bangladesh has 
implemented this type of incentive-based scheme 
to improve hilsa shad fisheries in the Bay of Bengal, 
providing fishers with in-kind payments of food and 
support for alternative income generation during fishing 
ban periods (Islam et al., 2016a; Islam et al., 2016b). 
1.2 Choice experiments
Understanding participants’ preferences and 
compensation needs is pivotal to ensuring their 
acceptance and, consequently, the scheme’s 
effectiveness. Among the methodological tools 
available to assess potential participants’ attitudes 
and preferences in incentive-based schemes, ‘choice 
experiments’ are increasingly widely used (Villanueva, 
Glenk and Rodríguez-Entrena, 2017; Hanley and 
Czajkowski, 2019). A choice experiment is a survey-
based tool to elicit preferences that asks respondents 
to make choices between various alternatives. 
For environmental incentive-based schemes, the 
alternatives are often hypothetical conservation 
agreements between participants and a governing 
institution. Agreements typically include changes to 
natural resource management, important contractual 
terms such as contract length or monitoring by the 
implementing authority, and monetary and in-kind 
payments. Prospective participants are assumed to only 
choose one of the agreements on offer, if they expect 
the compensation to be more than the income they will 
forgo under the given contractual terms. Respondents 
have the option, where none of the agreements are 
expected to yield them net benefits, to indicate that they 
would not participate with any of the agreements shown. 
There are three benefits to using choice experiments 
to inform the design of incentive-based schemes. First, 
decision makers learn important information on the 
relative importance of contractual terms in scheme 
participation. Second, decision makers are provided 
with information on participants’ compensation needs 
under varying contractual terms. Third, decision 
makers can infer likely participation rates depending 
on contractual terms. All three aspects are important 
factors driving the efficiency and effectiveness of 
incentive-based schemes.
Choice experiment studies with prospective participants 
of incentive-based schemes can also help reveal how 
perceptions of the importance of contractual terms, 
compensation needs and stated participation differ 
across the surveyed population. This knowledge may 
be used to align the design of schemes with local 
conditions and individual preferences (Costedoat 
et al., 2016). Of concern here may be, for example, 
different preferences for the type of incentive (monetary, 
in-kind, individual vs. collective) among socioeconomic 
strata of the population, or differences in preferences for 
management prescriptions across geographical areas 
(Bladon et al., 2018). 
1.3 A choice experiment 
study in the Ayeyarwady 
Delta
This report summarises research that SRUC’s 
Sustainable Ecosystems team was commissioned to 
do as part of the Darwin-HilsaMM project “Carrots and 
sticks: incentives to conserve hilsa fish in Myanmar” 
led by the International Institute for Environment 
and Development (IIED) and funded through the 
UK government’s Darwin Initiative. The research 
comprised of supporting the design, implementation 
and analysis of a choice experiment study conducted 
with fishing communities in four townships within the 
Ayeyarwady Delta region of Myanmar. It was part of 
an effort to identify opportunities for incentive-based 
schemes for the conservation of hilsa shad fisheries. 
The research was undertaken in close collaboration 
with project partners and groups in Myanmar including 
the WorldFish Centre, Department of Fisheries (DoF), 
Yangon University and Network Activities Group (NAG). 
The study contributes to an improved understanding of 
the socioeconomics of hilsa fishing and complements 
earlier survey research aimed at socioeconomic 
benchmarking of fishing communities in the Ayeyarwady 
Delta by Khaing et al. (2018). 
The report is structured as follows: Section 2 provides 
an overview of the choice experiment design and 
the data collection and analysis process. Section 3 
presents the modelling results and notes from the field. 
Section 4 concludes with key policy recommendations. 
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2 
Methods
2.1 Choice experiment 
design
A crucial step in the design of any choice experiment 
study is selecting the ‘attributes’ that characterise the 
hypothetical conservation agreements that participants 
will need to choose between. In this study we consider: 
what changes to hilsa fishery management would be 
suggested to the prospective participants; what type 
and level of incentive would be offered, and what kind 
of payment vehicle; and when and how incentives 
would be paid. Ideally, management changes included 
in the choice experiment should rest on solid scientific 
evidence for their effectiveness in improving hilsa 
sustainability. However, apart from recent work on 
spawning seasonality that was not available at the 
time of the study design (Bladon et al., 2019), there is 
limited information in Myanmar on hilsa ecology – and 
virtually no specific evidence on the effectiveness 
of management interventions. Selecting appropriate 
management changes to facilitate hilsa conservation 
was therefore largely based on the expert opinion of 
local partners and the experience of previous incentive-
based schemes for hilsa conservation in Bangladesh 
(Islam et al., 2016a; Bladon et al., 2018). 
The following criteria guided the selection process:
• In the absence of firm evidence, there must a plausible 
mechanism for a management intervention to be 
effective.
• There must be credible means (at least in theory) 
to monitor compliance and enforce management 
interventions. 
• It must be possible for management interventions to 
be implemented within the remit of the Department of 
Fisheries.
• The management intervention must not fundamentally 
threaten local livelihoods.
• The terms and conditions of the management 
interventions (scope, timing etc) can be clearly 
explained to respondents (fishers).
An initial list of options was compiled during a workshop 
in Edinburgh in April 2019 and further refined after 
consultation with local project partners, including the 
Myanmar Department of Fisheries (see Table 1). 
Both monetary and in-kind compensation were 
considered. Amounts of monetary compensation were 
initially guided by data from the previous household 
survey to estimate forgone income, and adjusted after 
consultation with local project partners. For in-kind 
compensation, collective incentives were initially 
considered, such as a dedicated school boat service 
to improve the safety and reliability of children’s 
journeys to school. Alternative income generating 
assets such as rickshaws, sewing machines or dairy 
cows were offered in the Bangladesh hilsa fish scheme 
(Islam et al., 2016a); however, these were dismissed 
by the local research team as they could overlap 
with other local support programmes and would be 
logistically challenging. 
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A first version of the questionnaire was built around the 
attribute list in Table 1. It included: 
1. A new fishing ban that would last for seven days in 
one, two or three months in the period October to 
December 
2. New sanctuary spaces for juvenile hilsa that would 
be placed every 3, 6 or 9 miles along the river with a 
width of up to half the river, and
3. Requiring an increase of fishing net mesh to 4.5, 5 or 
6 inches for three months of the year. 
Compensation included monetary payments at six 
levels: US$ 30, 60, 100, 150, 200 and 300. In-kind 
compensation was also included in the form of a school 
ferry for the community to take school-aged children to 
and from school during the school year. 
2.2 The final design
Following feedback from the IIED, WorldFish and 
NAG correspondents, the attributes and their levels 
were adjusted for the final survey, which was piloted 
in Maubin township on 26 and 27 June 2019 (see 
more details in Section 2.3). The final list of attributes 
and their levels are reported in Table 2, with detailed 
information on adjustments below.
The in-kind collective incentive, which initially included 
the school boat service, was discarded since it would 
involve complex cross-institutional and cross-ministerial 
arrangements and regulations. Instead, an in-kind 
payment in the form of rice compensation was proposed 
by project partners as it would ensure a direct benefit 
for the household and would be logistically feasible. 
However, there were challenges to describing this form 
of compensation, which involved specific types and 
qualities of rice; communicating the weight in units that 
made sense locally; and avoiding potential clashes with 
food support programmes established in the area after 
Cyclone Nargis in 2008. 
Table 1. Options for hilsa fishery management interventions identified for the choice experiment
MeASuRe
MAnAgeMent pRobleM 
AddReSSed detAIled deSCRIptIon
Additional closure/ban 
to assist spawning
Fishing during spawning 
season
Current closure is from May to July to protect 
juvenile and brood fish. An additional ban between 
October and November/December would prevent 
fishing during a potential additional spawning 
season and thus help maintain and increase 
hilsa populations.1 
Require nets with larger 
mesh size to protect 
juveniles
Catching juvenile fish The current minimum net mesh size requirement is 
4 inches, but anecdotal evidence suggests most 
fishers use smaller mesh sizes. This management 
change would require fishers to use nets with a 
larger mesh size than is commonly practised to 
enable more juvenile fish to escape the catch. 
Fishers would be required to use nets with a larger 
mesh size from October to December, and nets 
would be marked with a unique colour to help 
monitor compliance. Nets would be distributed by 
and returned to the local Department of Fisheries 
stations after use during these months.
Additional sanctuaries to 
protect juveniles
Catching juvenile fish Total ban in marked areas in places that could serve 
as nursery grounds for juveniles (eg deposition 
areas with lower flow velocity). 
1 At the time of this study it was uncertain whether or not an additional spawning season takes place in November and December. 
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The final survey design required units and 
measurements that are understood by small-scale 
fishers. Attributes referring to management changes 
therefore used inches and miles (as opposed to 
centimetres and kilometres). The survey used the 
Burmese lunisolar calendar, with clearly defined 
periods giving the full moon as the reference for closure 
periods. After consultation with local project partners, 
sanctuaries were defined as covering a maximum of one 
mile of river length, and up to half of the river width.
Cash payments were listed in Myanmar kyat (MMK). 
The range of cash payments was set from MMK 75,000 
to 350,000 (US$ 53 to 248). The project partners 
considered the maximum cash payment to be high 
compared to the potential income lost through 
compliance with management changes.
The best local variety of rice was offered, paw san from 
Pyapon township or Shwe Bo township, in amounts 
of one, two or three tinn (a Myanmar measure of 
volume commonly used for rice). The standard weight 
equivalent of 1 tinn ranges from 46 pounds (20.9 
kilograms) to 56 pounds (25.4kg), with prices ranging 
from MMK 1,125 to 1,475 per kilogram (US$ 0.8 to 1 
per kilogram) . This has a market value of MMK 23,500 
to 37,500 per tinn of rice (US$ 17 to 27 per tinn 
of rice).
An initial idea of adding an attribute to the survey 
about the timing of payments was dismissed, to 
make the choices less complex. Payments of both 
rice and money were specified as one-off payments 
once a year in the Burmese month of Thadingyut (the 
seventh month of the Burmese calendar, approximately 
Table 2. Final list of attributes and attribute levels used in the choice experiment
AttRIbute lAbel level 1 level 2 level 3 level 4
Additional 
periods of closure
CLOSE No change No fishing during 
Thadingyut2 for 
3 days before and 
3 days after the full 
moon, for a total 
closure of 7 days
No fishing during 
Thadingyut and 
Tazaungmon for 
3 days before and 
3 days after the full 
moon in each month, 
for a total closure of 
14 days
No fishing during 
Thadingyut, 
Tazaungmon, and 
Natdaw for 3 days 
before and 3 days 
after the full moon 
in each month, for 
a total closure of 
21 days
Creation of 
sanctuaries
SANCT No change New sanctuary every 
9 miles, maximum 
length 1 mile of river, 
up to half the width 
of river
New sanctuary every 
6 miles, maximum 
length 1 mile of river, 
up to half the width 
of river
New sanctuary every 
3 miles, maximum 
length 1 mile of river, 
up to half the width 
of river
Nets with 
4.5-inch mesh 
required between 
Thadingyut and 
Natdaw (October 
to December)
NETS No change Ban on all other 
nets, only use nets 
distributed by DoF 
with 4.5-inch mesh 
during Thadingyut, 
Tazaungmon and 
Natdaw
In-kind payment 
(rice)
RICE No rice 
payment
1 tinn* 2 tinn 3 tinn
Cash payment 
(MMK)**
CASH 75,000 150,000 250,000 350,000
Note: The levels of the ‘No agreement’ alternative were ‘No change’ in management attributes, and no rice and cash payments. *Tinn 
is a Myanmar measure of volume commonly used for rice. The standard weight equivalent of 1 tinn ranges from 46 pounds (20.9kg) to 
56 pounds (25.4kg). **MMK – Myanmar kyat, MMK 1,000 = US$ 0.7 in June 2019
2 Thadingyut is the seventh month of the Burmese lunisolar calendar, approximately coinciding with October in the Gregorian calendar. Tazaungmon is the eight 
month, approximately coinciding with November. Natdaw is the ninth month, approximately coinciding with December. 
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coinciding with October), one week before the Festival 
of Lights celebration. This was suggested to be a time 
of festivities such as marriages, when supplemental 
income could be perceived very useful. Respondents 
were informed that the Department of Fisheries (DoF) 
would hand out compensation in the form of rice at the 
nearest township. Monetary payments would also be 
distributed by the DoF; money could be collected at the 
township or administered by a mobile phone service 
such as Wave. Respondents were also informed that 
changes in rules for hilsa fishing, and compensation for 
fishers who adhere to the new rules, would be agreed 
through written agreements between fishers and 
the DoF.
To aid local respondents’ understanding, a local 
artist provided drawings of aspects of management 
interventions. These were used alongside descriptions 
in the text to introduce the idea of hilsa fishery 
management changes and conservation agreements, 
and to describe the various choices. Simple graphical 
depictions of attribute levels also featured in the choice 
tasks in the survey. Respondents’ literacy rate was 
expected to be high, but visual aids were still thought 
necessary to help people understand the management 
interventions and the choice tasks. Figure 1 shows an 
example graphic used to convey the idea of sanctuaries 
to protect juvenile hilsa. 
Each choice task shown to respondents contained two 
alternatives representing hilsa conservation agreements. 
In addition to the two conservation agreement 
alternatives, a ‘No agreement’ alternative was added to 
the choice tasks. Respondents were therefore asked 
to choose between two hilsa conservation agreements 
with varying attributes and levels, or non-participation 
indicated by ‘No agreement’. An experimental design 
was used to create the combinations of attributes and 
levels in each of the conservation agreements in the 
choice tasks to be shown to respondents. For a more 
detailed explanation of the experiment design see 
Appendix 1.
The final choice experiment design included 36 choice 
tasks in six blocks, so that each respondent had six 
choice tasks. We designed it so that at least one of the 
two management alternatives shown in each choice task 
required a change from the current status quo, in return 
for in-kind or monetary compensation. We then tested 
the design using pre-tests and a small pilot in a village 
in the Maubin township area. An example of the choice 
tasks is shown in Figure 2. 
We considered it important to include an example 
choice task at the start of the choice experiment section 
of the survey to enable participants to understand the 
information in the choice tasks, even though this could 
Figure 1. Artist’s impression of sanctuaries to protect juvenile hilsa 
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introduce some bias in their decisions (Meyerhoff 
and Glenk, 2015). If respondents were unable to 
make a choice in this example task, the interviewers 
repeated the explanation. Before answering the series 
of six choice tasks, respondents were reminded to 
carefully consider the trade-offs between payments and 
management changes, and the implications for their 
household, including in terms of income. Respondents 
were also explicitly reminded to only opt for the offered 
conservation agreements if they were willing to comply 
with the proposed management changes, given the level 
of compensation stated in the agreements.
2.3 Overall questionnaire 
structure
The questionnaire started with collecting some basic 
information about respondents, being mindful of the aim 
to re-interview fisher households previously included 
in the socioeconomic survey (Khaing et al., 2018; 
see Section 2.5). This was followed by a step-by-step 
introduction of each attribute (such as the fishing 
ban periods), interspersed with related questions on 
respondents’ concerns about hilsa, their awareness of 
spawning periods, their use of nets and the distance 
they live from fishing grounds. Following the choice 
tasks, the questionnaire finishes with a series of 
questions on respondents’ perceived life satisfaction 
and decision making in the household. 
This report focuses on results of the choice experiment 
and differences in preferences and compensation needs 
by area (township), social class and gender. Social 
class is an indicator used previously by the Khaing et al. 
(2018) survey to allocate respondent households to one 
of four classes constructed by the Network Activities 
Group. Social Class 1 is Chan Thar (‘better off’); 2 is 
Ah Lae Ah Latt (‘middle class’); 3 is Nwan Par (‘poor’); 
and 4 is Ah Lon Nwan Par (‘very poor’). Households 
in the ‘better off’ class were described as not having 
concerns about daily survival with a generally higher 
standard of living and access to alternative livelihoods, 
while households classified as ‘very poor’ struggle for 
their daily survival and have many dependents (Khaing 
et al., 2018).
Figure 2. Example choice task
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2.4 Econometric approach
The choice data was analysed using a ‘mixed logit 
model’, a statistical model for examining discrete 
choices, to investigate respondents’ ‘willingness 
to accept’ (WTA). WTA is a measure of the 
minimum amount that a person is willing to accept in 
compensation for accepting something that is perceived 
as negative, such as income forgone from adhering to 
management restrictions. A detailed description of the 
econometric approach is provided in Appendix 2.
2.5 Sampling and 
implementation
A total of 381 households were surveyed in four 
townships of the Ayeyerwady Delta: Ngapudaw, Maubin, 
Mawlamyinegyun and Labutta, in July, October and 
November 2019. The surveying period in July 2019 
included a pilot in the township of Maubin followed by 
main data collection in this township. The remaining 
townships were surveyed between October and 
November 2019 due to ease of access to villages at 
the end of the rainy season. Within the four townships, 
villages were selected for the choice experiment survey 
based on ease of travel and access during the monsoon 
season. Selected villages were either accessible 
via the main road or by car, motorbike or motorboat, 
and required less than one day of travel. This was 
mostly due to the timing of the survey, as some of the 
villages included in the socioeconomic survey were 
difficult to reach during monsoon season. Figure 3 
shows the distribution of surveyed villages within the 
Ayeyarwady Delta. 
Where possible, respondents were chosen to overlap 
with households that had participated in a household 
survey conducted in April 2018 (Khaing et al., 2018). 
Respondents to the Khaing et al. socioeconomic survey 
had been selected using ‘purposive sampling’, by asking 
village leaders to select diverse hilsa fishing households 
based on social class, location in the village and social 
networks, among other criteria. If previous respondents 
or households were unavailable they were replaced. 
For example, if respondents had moved to Yangon 
they were replaced by other household members, or if 
members of the household were unavailable for longer 
periods of time due to longer fishing explorations they 
Figure 3. Location of townships and villages surveyed in the Ayeyarwady Delta
Source: https://earthshots.usgs.gov/earthshots/. The map showing village locations was based on Google Maps 
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were replaced by other fishing households in the same 
villages. New respondents were added if a target of 
18 respondents per village could not be achieved 
through surveying previous households. Fishing 
households that were not in the earlier socioeconomic 
survey were chosen in consultation with the village 
head. The key criterion for inclusion in the survey was 
that the new household was heavily involved in fishing. 
Apart from Maubin, which was the pilot study area and 
had focused on fishers rather than gender, there was a 
focus on including female respondents in the townships 
to better represent their preferences in the overall 
sample. In general, women in the villages are more 
engaged with domestic affairs, education and selling 
fish, while men are more likely to engage in fishing and 
boat and gear repair (Khaing et al., 2018). 
Data collection was conducted by a team of interviewers 
from NAG: four interviewers in Maubin township and 
six in the other three townships. Before the fieldwork, 
all the interviewers took part in a two-day training 
workshop to introduce them to choice experiments and 
to run through the questionnaire in detail. The training 
also covered good interview practice and included role 
play to practise delivering the survey. The training also 
served to refine the survey, based on feedback from 
interviewers and other staff from NAG who attended 
the workshop. The interviewer team were instructed to 
give respondents a detailed description of the reasoning 
behind the programme and the policies being offered. 
They then asked respondents for verbal consent, 
which was recorded before proceeding with the rest of 
the survey. 
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3 
Results and discussion
3.1 Sample characteristics
An overview of the sampled households’ characteristics 
is given in Table 3. A large proportion of households had 
participated in the previous socioeconomic household 
survey (Khaing et al., 2018). Mawlamyinekyun and 
Labutta township surveys achieved a higher rate of 
female respondents, with over 30%, than Maubin and 
Ngawpudaw. In terms of social class, Mawlamyinekyun 
and Labutta townships had a larger proportion of 
poorer households (4 being the poorest) with more 
dependency on fishing (Khaing et al., 2018) than 
Maubin and Ngawpudaw. 
3.2 Model results: full 
sample
Table 4 reports the mixed logit model results for the 
full sample (for comparison, Table A1 in Appendix 2 
shows the results of a model with continuously coded 
non-monetary attributes). The estimate of the alternative 
specific constant (ASC)3 associated with the ‘No 
agreement’ alternative, 0.765, is large and significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level. In other words, a 
considerable proportion of respondents selected a 
conservation agreement – rather than no agreement – 
more frequently than predicted if only information from 
attributes is used. 
Table 3. Distribution of respondents by township: previous survey participation, gender, social class
MAubIn ngAwpudAw
MAwlAMyI-
nekyun lAbuttA
Surveyed households who participated 
in previous survey* (%)
78.26 84.44 83.33 80.68
Female (%) 13.04 12.22 36.67 30.68
Social Class 1 (%) 0.87 4.44 1.14
Social Class 2 (%) 43.48 43.33 21.11 11.36
Social Class 3 (%) 49.57 37.78 51.11 28.41
Social Class 4 (%) 6.09 14.44 27.78 59.09
Number of respondents 115 90 90 88
Note: *Khaing et al. (2018). Social classes are defined as 1 – better off; 2 – middle class; 3 – poor; and 4 – very poor
3 The ASC is a constant term added to capture the systematic influence that alternatives may have on respondents’ choice that is not captured by information 
coming from attributes.
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Across the sample, there was a low rate of choice for 
the ‘No agreement’ alternative (11% of all choices). 
This may be indicative of a true desire for change. 
However, such an interpretation should be treated with 
caution, because the possibility of some form of ‘cultural 
bias’ (cultural ways of expressing consent or dissent) 
cannot be denied. Such forms of behaviour were found 
in previous stated preference studies in Southeast 
Asia (eg Whittington, 1998) and may be underpinned 
by cultural norms. Another interpretation relates to 
respondents’ perceptions of the expected benefits 
of any hilsa conservation programme, irrespective of 
compensation. For example, some respondents may 
have perceived the ‘No agreement’ option as ‘missing 
a chance’ to obtain some general financial support for 
their livelihoods. This may have led to a propensity not 
to select the ‘No agreement’ alternative, even if the 
respondent did not judge as favourable the trade-offs 
between compensation payments and management 
changes. The relatively large magnitude (in WTA terms) 
of the ASC may also be due to the limited influence of 
the compensation amounts on people’s choices.
Closures
In terms of the suggested closures (fishing bans) in 
addition to the one already in place between May and 
July, the results make intuitive sense. The estimate for 
longer closures (eg CLOSE_21) is negative and of a 
greater magnitude compared to shorter closures. This 
can be explained by the fact that longer closures are 
associated with less access to the fishing grounds and 
therefore greater need for compensation. It is interesting 
that the estimate for a 7-day closure is not statistically 
significant. This closure would take place around the 
main festival in October, where fishers may be more 
heavily engaged in non-fishing activities and therefore 
may perceive the additional closure in this period less 
likely to reduce potential income from fishing. The data 
suggest that a closure in this period would therefore 
represent a relatively widely accepted management 
option that would not require much compensation. It 
is noteworthy that there is a considerable variation in 
preferences for a 21-day closure (split across three 
months). This suggests that compensation needs 
vary considerably: a 21-day closure has a low level 
of acceptance for some, while it is more acceptable 
for others. 
Required net mesh size 
Changes to fishing net use had a very strong influence 
on choices made by respondents. This confirms 
findings from our earlier pre-test and reports from the 
field and suggests that the restriction on fishing nets 
faces a large degree of opposition; and would require 
the largest compensation amount. It is possible that, 
for some respondents, having a larger mesh net was 
deemed entirely unacceptable. Changes in mesh size 
Table 4. Results of mixed logit model of willingness to accept 
each attribute, full sample
AttRIbute
wtA 
eStIMAte 
StAndARd 
eRRoR
Mean
ASC_NA –0.765 0.137 **
CLOSE_7 0.101 0.209
CLOSE_14 –0.569 0.248 **
CLOSE_21 –1.041 0.291 **
NETS –0.341 0.048 **
SANCT_3 –0.570 0.273 **
SANCT_6 –0.094 0.243
SANCT_9 0.344 0.229
RICE_1 –0.015 0.215
RICE_2 0.363 0.217 *
RICE_3 0.233 0.267
CASHa 0 – 
Standard deviation
ASC_NA –0.621 0.104 **
CLOSE_7 0.086 0.535
CLOSE_14 –0.008 0.460
CLOSE_21 –2.434 0.537 **
NETS 0.593 0.106 **
SANCT_3 1.277 0.458 **
SANCT_6 0.034 0.528
SANCT_9 –0.674 0.498
RICE_1 0.031 0.472
RICE_2 0.068 0.567
RICE_3 0.645 0.700
CASH 0.694 0.115
Number of individuals 383
Number of observations 2,297
LL (final) –1,635.001
Rho-square (0) 0.352
Notes: **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level; afixed to 
zero to constrain triangular distribution to positive domain; ASC_NA 
– alternative specific constant associated with “No agreement”; 
CLOSE – fishing bans for 7, 14 or 21 days; NETS – only DoF 
large-mesh nets to be used at certain periods; SANCT – juvenile 
hilsa sanctuaries placed every 3, 6 or 9 miles along the river; 
RICE – rice as compensation in 1, 2 or 3 tinn; CASH – money as 
compensation; LL – value of the log-likelihood function
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requirements would therefore have to be highly effective 
compared to other conservation methods to be worth 
taking forward initially. Further in-depth exploration is 
needed of the reasons for opposition to this change.
Sanctuaries
For the proposal of sanctuary areas to protect juvenile 
hilsa, the results in Table 4 suggest that respondents 
would have less need for compensation the further apart 
the sanctuaries were placed. In other words, fishers are 
less concerned about sanctuaries when they are placed 
further apart. In line with field reports, respondents show 
the most concern about sanctuaries being placed as 
close as three miles from each other, primarily because 
this could interfere with the prevalent fishing practice 
of drift netting (Leadbitter, 2017). Like the seven-day 
closure in October, there is a considerable degree of 
variation that may arise from differences in local fishing 
practices and the resulting differences in how fishers 
perceive the implications of closely spaced sanctuaries. 
On average, there appears to be no compensation need 
for sanctuaries spaced at a greater distance, particularly 
if they are nine miles apart. Therefore, sanctuaries 
spaced at an acceptable distance, taking into account 
primary fishing grounds’ proximity to villages, could 
be a promising management measure to explore. 
This is similar to Bangladeshi fishers’ perceptions of 
sanctuary spaces, where 80% of respondents stated 
that they perceive sanctuaries as acceptable (Islam et 
al., 2016b). Some fishers are already attempting to use 
sanctuary spaces within their own communities; fishers 
from Hta Ni Daunt in Maubin township reported three 
areas that they as a community do not use for fishing, 
in order to protect the available stocks. These areas are 
close to the village, all approximately one mile in length, 
and are along sand banks where juveniles are located.
Rice as compensation
None of the estimates for in-kind (rice) compensation 
is statistically significant, suggesting a high degree 
of indifference, even though fishers may have been 
expected to prefer to have more rice than less. Standard 
deviation terms are also not significant, suggesting 
a limited variation in respondents’ preferences. It is 
unclear what exactly underpinned this result. One 
reason may be that the amounts offered were, on 
average, perceived as insufficient to trigger a response 
– possibly because current and expected rice supplies 
may be good. The underlying reasons could be further 
validated in the field; and alternative forms of in-kind 
compensation explored through discussion and rapid 
appraisals with different strata (social class, gender) 
of fishers.
Cash as compensation
The WTA estimate for the cash compensation is 
significant and positive, suggesting that on average 
larger amounts of monetary compensation increased the 
likelihood that fishers chose a conservation agreement. 
Reports from the field (see more below) suggest that at 
least some of the fishers perceived the amounts of cash 
compensation to be too low compared to the income 
they expected to forgo from abiding by the management 
changes specified in the hypothetical conservation 
agreements. Together with a low degree of choice of 
the ‘No agreement’ alternative, this may indicate that 
some respondents have ignored information on cash 
compensation when making their choices. This is 
known as ‘attribute non-attendance’ and would result 
in an upwards bias of willingness to accept estimates 
(eg Scarpa et al., 2009; Glenk et al., 2015). It should 
therefore be taken into account when interpreting the 
estimates for policy purposes.
Table 5 shows estimates of mean marginal willingness 
to accept per household and year for the various survey 
attributes. The perceived need for compensation 
is highest for the proposed change to nets with a 
lower mesh size, followed by the proposed additional 
closed period of 21 days over three months. The next 
highest level of required compensation is for a closed 
period of 14 days and the establishment of sanctuary 
areas spaced every three miles, which are both of a 
similar magnitude.
Table 5. Mean marginal willingness to accept attributes, full 
sample model
AttRIbute
wtA peR houSehold And yeAR
(In MMk 1,000)*
CLOSE_7 n.s.
CLOSE_14 56.92
CLOSE_21 104.06
NETS 340.70
SANCT_3 57.03
SANCT_6 n.s.
SANCT_9 n.s.
RICE_1 n.s.
RICE_2 n.s.
RICE_3 n.s.
Note: *in other words, compensation required for management 
change; n.s. – not significantly different from zero at the 5% level; 
WTA – willingness to accept; CLOSE – fishing bans for 7, 14 or 
21 days; NETS – only DoF large-mesh nets to be used at certain 
periods; SANCT – juvenile hilsa sanctuaries placed every 3, 6 or 9 
miles along the river; RICE – rice as compensation in 1, 2 or 3 tinn; 
*MMK 1,000 = US$0.7 (average exchange rate June 2019).
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3.3 Model results: by 
township
The data was also analysed separately by township. 
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 6 and an 
overview of marginal willingness to accept estimates 
is provided in Table 7. There were issues with the 
convergence of the ‘willingess to accept’ space 
model for Ngawpudaw, so data for this township was 
analysed in ‘preference’ space. This analysis reveals 
that the estimate for monetary compensation was 
not significantly different from zero – in other words 
respondents were indifferent to changes in monetary 
compensation – which meant that the willingness 
to accept for changes in management attributes 
or in-kind compensation could not be estimated. 
Field observations by the survey team confirm that 
respondents in this township paid little attention to 
in-kind or monetary compensation, because their 
estimated earnings from fishing exceed the offered level 
of compensation for the proposed fishing restrictions. 
In terms of preferences for management changes, the 
results also confirm observations from the field that 
fishers were most concerned about using nets with 
larger mesh size, that they would accept a fishing ban 
in the month of October but not other months, and that 
they are indifferent to sanctuary areas that are placed 
every 6 or 9 miles of river length. Some fishers, however, 
were concerned about closely spaced sanctuaries 
(every 3 miles) in case these areas overlapped with 
fishing grounds. 
Results are qualitatively similar for Mawlamyinekyun 
and Labutta townships, except that on average 
respondents were responsive to the various amounts of 
monetary compensation offered. Interestingly, fishers 
in Mawlamyinekyun seem to particularly welcome 
sanctuary areas placed every 9 miles, as the negative 
WTA estimate for this attribute level suggests – in 
other words, fishers may perceive some sanctuaries as 
beneficial and thus not require additional compensation. 
Some fishers in Mawlamyinekyun also reported that 
the greatest monetary compensation offered in the 
choice experiment is insufficient. They suggested that 
compensation should be in the area of MMK 450,000 
or 500,000 for closed periods of 21 days spanning 
three months, because these months are very profitable, 
with earnings of between MMK 150,000 and 200,000 
(US$ 106 to US$ 142) for seven days of fishing. Similar 
statements were made by fishers in Labutta township.
Results for Maubin township are qualitatively similar 
to results for the full sample of management changes: 
closures in October are accepted without additional 
compensation needs, while additional closed periods in 
November and December would require compensation. 
Only sanctuary areas that are placed close together 
would be a concern that required compensation. In 
line with results across other townships, changes to 
a smaller mesh size net are perceived to be the most 
problematic, drawing the greatest compensation 
requirements. There is a major difference in the 
response of Maubin township’s interviewees to in-
kind compensation in the form of rice. Estimates are 
significantly different from zero for two and three 
Table 6. Mean marginal willingness to accept attributes, by township
MAubIn MAwlAMyInekyun lAbuttA
AttRIbute wtA peR houSehold And yeAR (In MMk 1,000*)
CLOSE_7 n.s. n.s. n.s.
CLOSE_14 104.79 n.s. n.s.
CLOSE_21 182.05 n.s. n.s.
NETS 237.60 421.74 190.27
SANCT_3 87.32 n.s. n.s.
SANCT_6 n.s. n.s. n.s.
SANCT_9 n.s. –104.80 n.s.
RICE_1 n.s. n.s. n.s.
RICE_2 –73.13 n.s. n.s.
RICE_3 –77.95 n.s. n.s.
Notes: n.s.: not significantly different from zero at the 5% level; WTA – willingness to accept; CLOSE – fishing bans for 7, 14 or 21 days; 
NETS – only DoF large-mesh nets to be used at certain periods; SANCT – juvenile hilsa sanctuaries placed every 3, 6 or 9 miles along the 
river; RICE – rice as compensation in 1, 2 or 3 tinn; *MMK 1,000 = US$0.7 (average exchange rate June 2019).
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Table 7. Results of mixed logit models, by township
MAubIn ngAwpudAwb MAwlAMyInekyun lAbuttA
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ASC_NA –0.885 0.281 ** –0.425 0.100 ** –0.796 0.293 ** –0.373 0.127 **
CLOSE_7 0.419 0.339 0.072 0.367 0.404 0.527 –0.122 0.254
CLOSE_14 –1.048 0.325 ** –0.956 0.469 ** 0.297 0.720 0.403 0.479
CLOSE_21 –1.821 0.428 ** –0.855 0.536 –0.768 0.681 0.649 0.675
NETS –0.238 0.050 ** –0.273 0.085 ** –0.491 0.156 ** –0.190 0.049 **
SANCT_3 –0.873 0.345 ** –0.263 0.493 –0.422 0.654 –0.345 0.407
SANCT_6 –0.263 0.341 –0.035 0.397 –0.018 0.572 0.116 0.359
SANCT_9 0.043 0.311 0.027 0.331 1.048 0.626 * 0.459 0.323
RICE_1 0.361 0.289 –0.246 0.327 –0.752 0.681 0.055 0.286
RICE_2 0.731 0.307 ** 0.322 0.373 –0.111 0.653 0.045 0.327
RICE_3 0.780 0.335 ** 0.157 0.458 –0.398 0.736 –0.095 0.409
CASHa 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000 –
Standard deviation
ASC_NA 0.978 0.282 ** 0.335 0.084 ** 0.345 0.143 ** –0.251 0.090 **
CLOSE_7 0.022 0.642 0.696 0.903 –0.013 0.837 0.025 0.386
CLOSE_14 0.008 0.438 0.034 0.964 –0.150 1.155 –0.024 0.622
CLOSE_21 1.744 0.696 ** –1.131 0.639 * 2.718 1.181 ** –2.199 0.729 **
NETS –0.358 0.106 ** –0.494 0.105 ** –0.810 0.291 ** –0.369 0.100 **
SANCT_3 0.461 1.014 1.634 0.640 ** 1.591 0.949 * 1.230 0.541 **
SANCT_6 –0.001 0.453 –1.349 0.606 ** 0.045 2.129 0.010 0.336
SANCT_9 –0.076 0.866 1.021 0.674 –0.102 1.452 –0.001 0.386
RICE_1 0.022 0.642 0.062 1.192 0.568 1.665 –0.358 0.727
RICE_2 –0.009 0.635 0.082 1.006 1.529 0.856 * 0.028 0.478
RICE_3 –0.509 1.158 –1.048 0.660 –0.183 1.645 –0.242 0.807
CASH 0.753 0.199 ** 0.311 0.233 0.707 0.259 ** 1.191 0.302 **
Number of 
individuals 
115 90 90 88
Number of 
observations 
690 539 540 528
LL (final) –506.914 –389.867 –338.36 –338.464
Rho-square (0) 0.331 0.342 0.43 0.417
Note: All models in WTA space except for the Ngawpudaw model, which is estimated in preference space; ** Significant at 5% level; * 
significant at 10% level; a fixed to zero to constrain triangular distribution to positive domain; b model in preference space. ASC_NA – 
alternative specific constant for ‘No agreement’; CLOSE – fishing bans for 7, 14 or 21 days; NETS – only DoF large-mesh nets to be used 
at certain periods; SANCT – juvenile hilsa sanctuaries placed every 3, 6 or 9 miles along the river; RICE – rice as compensation in 1, 2 or 
3 tinn; CASH – money as compensation; LL – value of log-likelihood function
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tinn of rice being offered as part of conservation 
agreements, suggesting willingness to accept some 
in-kind compensation. In monetary terms, respondents 
of Maubin township value compensation in the form of 
rice between MMK 73,000 (US$ 52) for two tinn of rice 
(RICE_2) and MMK 78,000 (US$ 55) for three tinn of 
rice (RICE_3). Both estimates are within the range of 
market value for the type of rice on offer, which ranges 
between MMK 23,500 (US$ 17) and 37,500(US$ 27) 
per tinn. This indicates that there is no particular 
advantage for institutions governing an incentive-based 
conservation scheme to use in-kind compensation 
rather than money as compensation.
3.4 Model results: by social 
class
In terms of differences in preferences and willingness 
to accept across social class, model results shown 
in Table 8 and WTA estimates shown in Table 9 
indicate qualitatively similar results. However, there are 
differences in estimates of willingness to accept, for 
additional closed periods. 
For ‘better off’ and ‘middle class’ respondents (Social 
Class 1 and 2), willingness to accept estimates for 
14-day and 21-day closures are statistically significant, 
meaning that households in these groups require some 
compensation amount in return for the implementation 
of these closures. A 21-day closure attracts significant 
compensation needs for ‘poor’ (Social Class 3). None 
of the willingness to accept estimates for closed 
periods is significantly different from zero for ‘very 
poor’ respondents (Social Class 4). Coefficients for 
closely spaced sanctuaries (every three miles) are all 
negative but not significantly different from zero, in other 
words respondents were not concerned about these 
measures, but there is significant heterogeneity around 
the mean for ‘poor’ respondents. This means that 
acceptability of these measures varies greatly across 
members of this social class. Preferences for in-kind 
compensation as part of conservation agreements may 
be expected to differ depending on social class; less 
wealthy households may be expected to show a greater 
demand for additional in-kind compensation. However, 
only one coefficient (two tinn of rice) is significant for 
‘better off’ and ‘middle class’ respondents across all 
three models, confirming an overall limited interest in 
rice as a form of in-kind compensation. 
The differences between social classes are difficult to 
explain. Fishers in the poor and very poor classes (3 and 
4) also spend more hours during the day fishing than the 
higher social classes (Khaing et al., 2018), suggesting 
that a change in net mesh size could potentially further 
increase the amount of time they must spend fishing 
during the day, possibly beyond acceptable limits. This 
may explain the stronger focus of poorer households on 
changes in net size. 
Table 8. Mean marginal willingness to accept attributes, by social class 
SoCIAl ClASS 1 And 2 SoCIAl ClASS 3 SoCIAl ClASS 4
AttRIbute
wtA peR houSehold And yeAR
(In MMk 1,000)*
CLOSE_7 n.s. n.s. n.s.
CLOSE_14 116.64 n.s. n.s.
CLOSE_21 142.57 99.04 n.s.
NETS 349.90 360.8 283.70
SANCT_3 n.s. n.s. n.s.
SANCT_6 n.s. n.s. n.s.
SANCT_9 n.s. n.s. n.s.
RICE_1 n.s. n.s. n.s.
RICE_2 -86.58 n.s. n.s.
RICE_3 n.s. n.s. n.s.
Note: WTA – willingness to accept; n.s. – not significantly different from zero at the 5% level; CLOSE – fishing bans for 7, 14 or 21 
days; NETS – only DoF large-mesh nets to be used at certain periods; SANCT – juvenile hilsa sanctuaries placed every 3, 6 or 9 miles 
along the river; RICE – rice as compensation in 1, 2 or 3 tinn; *MMK 1,000 = US$0.7 (average exchange rate June 2019).
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Table 9. Model results of mixed logit models of willingness to accept attributes, by social class 
SoCIAl ClASS 1&2 SoCIAl ClASS 3 SoCIAl ClASS 4
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ASC_NA –0.874 0.299 ** –0.669 0.175 ** –0.730 0.243 **
CLOSE_7 0.213 0.426 0.420 0.348 –0.489 0.332
CLOSE_14 –1.166 0.442 ** –0.359 0.374 –0.037 0.539
CLOSE_21 –1.426 0.533 ** –0.990 0.425 ** –0.570 0.660
NETS –0.350 0.094 ** –0.361 0.075 ** –0.284 0.076 **
SANCT_3 –0.829 0.518 –0.464 0.387 –0.376 0.493
SANCT_6 –0.460 0.457 –0.151 0.346 0.434 0.475
SANCT_9 –0.076 0.418 0.373 0.330 0.739 0.481
RICE_1 0.370 0.376 0.048 0.313 –0.567 0.473
RICE_2 0.866 0.410 ** 0.046 0.363 0.402 0.375
RICE_3 0.455 0.488 0.403 0.376 –0.345 0.545
CASHa 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000 –
Standard deviation
ASC_NA 0.801 0.253 ** –0.528 0.125 ** 0.545 0.173 **
CLOSE_7 0.024 1.156 0.374 1.231 –0.020 0.622
CLOSE_14 –0.006 1.126 –0.024 0.480 0.107 1.185
CLOSE_21 –2.340 1.006 ** 2.198 0.752 ** 3.325 1.086 **
NETS 0.618 0.212 ** –0.588 0.147 ** 0.526 0.167 **
SANCT_3 1.546 0.965 –1.168 0.610 * 1.033 0.794
SANCT_6 0.103 1.345 –0.016 0.607 –0.038 0.762
SANCT_9 –0.933 0.833 0.250 1.152 –0.895 0.685
RICE_1 0.023 0.685 0.167 0.769 –0.247 1.816
RICE_2 0.087 1.385 –0.008 0.837 –0.026 1.012
RICE_3 0.014 1.233 1.009 0.765 –0.133 1.108
CASH 0.602 0.195 ** 0.774 0.187 ** 0.822 0.245 **
Number of individuals 124 162 97
Number of observations 744 971 582
LL (final) -544.719 -671.797 –399.372
Rho-square (0) 0.334 0.370 0.375
Notes: ** Significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level; a fixed to zero to constrain triangular distribution to positive domain. ASC_NA – 
alternative specific constant for ‘No agreement’; CLOSE – fishing bans for 7, 14 or 21 days; NETS – only DoF large-mesh nets to be used 
at certain periods; SANCT – juvenile hilsa sanctuaries placed every 3, 6 or 9 miles along the river; RICE – rice as compensation in 1, 2 or 
3 tinn; CASH – money as compensation; LL – value of log-likelihood function
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3.5 Model results: by gender 
Model results based on gender (male/female) are 
reported in Table 10 and associated mean marginal 
willingness to accept estimates in Table 11. Apart from 
changes in nets, none of the mean WTA estimates for 
management changes or in-kind compensation are 
significantly different from zero for female respondents. 
For male respondents, WTA estimates for longer 
closures (14 and 21 days), changes in net mesh size 
and closely spaced sanctuary areas (3 miles apart) are 
significantly different from zero and slightly higher in 
magnitude than those for the full sample. 
Table 10. Results of mixed logit models in willingness to accept attributes, by gender 
FeMAle MAle
AttRIbute
wtA 
eStIMAte
StAndARd 
eRRoR
wtA 
eStIMAte
StAndARd 
eRRoR
Mean
ASC_NA –0.527 0.198 ** –0.883 0.200 **
CLOSE_7 0.236 0.376 0.090 0.263
CLOSE_14 0.217 0.526 –0.901 0.295 **
CLOSE_21 0.127 0.623 –1.489 0.371 **
NETS –0.216 0.061 ** –0.397 0.073 **
SANCT_3 0.008 0.508 –0.830 0.317 **
SANCT_6 –0.062 0.417 –0.155 0.296
SANCT_9 0.569 0.399 0.289 0.294
RICE_1 –0.513 0.444 0.169 0.250
RICE_2 0.213 0.400 0.370 0.276
RICE_3 0.278 0.431 0.121 0.361
CASHa 0.000 – 0.000 –
Standard deviation
ASC_NA –0.569 0.180 ** 0.651 0.140 **
CLOSE_7 –0.034 0.714 –0.045 0.595
CLOSE_14 0.019 0.526 –0.028 0.614
CLOSE_21 –1.139 0.635 * 3.090 0.873 **
NETS 0.419 0.128 ** 0.679 0.159 **
SANCT_3 1.043 0.637 –1.124 0.656 *
SANCT_6 –0.004 0.843 –0.031 0.640
SANCT_9 –0.062 0.800 –0.693 0.607
RICE_1 –0.003 0.395 0.100 0.912
RICE_2 –0.726 0.744 0.001 0.593
RICE_3 0.001 0.843 –0.807 0.806
CASH 0.946 0.264 ** 0.615 0.134 **
Number of individuals 82 299
Number of observations 492 1793
LL (final) –337.415 –1276.512
Rho-square (0) 0.376 0.352
Notes: ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at 10% level; a fixed to zero to constrain triangular distribution to positive domain; ASC_NA 
– alternative specific constant; CLOSE – fishing bans for 7, 14 or 21 days; NETS – only DoF large-mesh nets to be used at certain 
periods; SANCT – juvenile hilsa sanctuaries placed every 3, 6 or 9 miles along the river; RICE – rice as compensation in 1, 2 or 3 tinn; 
CASH – money as compensation; LL – value of log-likelihood function 
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A direct comparison between results for male and 
female respondents is difficult. The subsample of female 
respondents is smaller than the subsample of male 
respondents. This decreases the likelihood of observing 
whether or not attributes had a significant influence 
on the choice between conservation agreements, 
and therefore that coefficients would be significantly 
different from zero. However, the differences in 
preferences may also be due to the disparity in labour 
practices between men and women within the fish 
supply chain. While women in the villages tend to 
be more engaged in repairing nets and selling fish, 
men are more likely to engage more in fishing and 
boat repair (Khaing et al., 2018). Thus, while there 
is a lack of female participation in traditional fisher 
roles, their representation in the larger supply chain 
is not insignificant. Notably, there is no difference in 
preferences for in-kind compensation between male and 
female respondents. 
Table 11. Mean marginal willingness to accept attributes, 
township models
FeMAle MAle
AttRIbute
wtA peR houSehold And yeAR
(In MMk 1,000*)
CLOSE_7 n.s. n.s.
CLOSE_14 n.s. 90.13
CLOSE_21 n.s. 148.87
NETS 215.75 397.26
SANCT_3 n.s. 83.02
SANCT_6 n.s. n.s.
SANCT_9 n.s. n.s.
RICE_1 n.s. n.s.
RICE_2 n.s n.s.
RICE_3 n.s. n.s.
Note: WTA – willingness to accept; n.s. – not significantly different 
from zero at the 5% level; CLOSE – fishing bans for 7, 14 or 21 
days; NETS – only DoF large-mesh nets to be used at certain 
periods; SANCT – juvenile hilsa sanctuaries placed every 3, 6 or 9 
miles along the river; RICE – rice as compensation in 1, 2 or 3 tinn.* 
MMK 1,000 = US$ 0.7, exchange rate for June 2019. 
3.6 Notes from the field
This section summarises further impressions and 
information gathered during the course of the fieldwork. 
It collates some anecdotal evidence that provides 
perspective for the choice experiment results, but also 
points to additional areas of interest that might warrant 
attention for designing and implementing an incentive-
based hilsa conservation scheme in the region.
Alternative income generation
The first thing to note is that paddy cultivation is the 
main alternative livelihood for fishers in all townships 
surveyed. In addition, in one of the villages in Labutta 
township most people also cultivate mung beans. This 
has led to the decline in fish catches, due to the use 
of agrochemicals in the farmland area near fishing 
grounds. Apart from farming, net and mat weaving are 
alternative livelihoods, particularly for women, in some 
villages of Mawlamyinekyun township. In Ngapudaw and 
Labutta township respondents mentioned migration to 
Yangon or neighbouring countries, such as Malaysia and 
Thailand, as an alternative way of earning a livelihood.
Awareness of hilsa stocks
Interviewers noted that most fishers have perceived 
a decline in stock over the last decade. Respondents 
linked this to multiple causes, including an increase in 
the number of fishers, trawl fishing at the mouth of the 
river and the use of agrochemicals in farming. In Labutta 
township, respondents also added that building dams 
and bridges, and capturing with tiger nets has led to 
changes in the water course, reducing the availability 
of hilsa. 
Fishing governance
Field observations suggest that the perceived authority 
of the Fisher Development Association (FDA) varies 
across townships. It was perceived to be stronger in 
Mawlamyinekyun township than Ngapudaw, Labutta 
and Maubin townships. In Mawlamyinekyun township, 
FDA members carry out patrols to monitor conservation 
zones and detect illegal fishing or fishing techniques, 
such as the use of poison or electric shocks. The 
township has several conservation areas and all 
villages included in the survey are aware of them. In 
Ngapudaw township, respondents reported that illegal 
fishers often manage to circumvent the rules. Overall, 
in Maubin, fishers were interested in discussions about 
enforcing and regulating the fishing laws that are already 
in place, but felt that at least some responsibility for 
unsustainable hilsa fishery should be attributed to large-
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scale trawler fishing in estuaries and the sea. Fishers 
also discussed illegal practices such as using poison 
or electrocution to catch fish, and suggested that more 
regular monitoring of these practices could also help 
prevent fish stock decline.
Net mesh size
The use of nets remains an interesting area to explore 
further. Field observations suggest that most fishers in 
the area use a triple-layer trammel net for fishing, which 
are nominally illegal yet widely distributed and used. 
Many owned nets also fall below the legal mesh size of 
four inches. In Maubin, much of the discussion during 
surveying was about nets, especially their availability on 
the market. Many fishers argued that vendors should be 
prohibited from selling fishing nets that do not comply 
with regulations, rather than imposing regulations 
on fishers who use the purchased nets. A similar 
experience was recorded in Bangladesh, where fishers 
reported that manufacturers of microfilament nets still 
produce and sell the nets (Islam et al., 2016a). In some 
villages in Labutta, fishers indicated that their inability 
to buy any fishing nets meant that many had to abandon 
their traditional fishing livelihood and migrate to Yangon. 
Overall, respondents across all townships were willing 
to engage in discussions about hilsa management and 
conservation but were concerned about the monitoring 
and enforcement of rules. 
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Migratory patterns of Hilsa sHad in tHe MyanMar ayeyarwady delta
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Conclusions and 
recommendations
The results of this choice experiment study provide 
some important insights for the development of 
incentive-based conservation schemes for hilsa shad 
in Myanmar. The hypothetical conservation agreements 
offered to respondents entailed three management-
related attributes and two attributes offering monetary 
and in-kind compensation. On average, the respondents 
– fishers in four townships in the Ayeyarwady Delta 
– showed a tendency to choose one of the two 
conservation agreement alternatives shown in each 
choice task rather than the ‘No agreement’ alternative. 
This indicates a general willingness to participate 
in this type of scheme. However, this interpretation 
should be carefully assessed against the presence 
of cultural norms, notably a tendency to agree even 
though actual views are more critical or nuanced (see 
Whittington, 1998).
Looking at each of the proposed attributes for more 
sustainable hilsa management, the key findings are:
Additional closed periods to facilitate spawning 
are likely to be more acceptable if implemented around 
the main festival in October (Thadingyut). Additional 
closures in November and December (Tazaungmon 
and Natdaw) are likely to require higher compensation. 
Generally, the period from October to December 
is of great importance to fishers in terms of income 
generation. This needs to be considered when 
identifying appropriate compensation amounts. 
Restricting nets to those with a larger mesh size 
to assist juveniles to mature was perceived as the most 
controversial change. Fishers showed the greatest 
demand for compensation if net use restrictions were 
to form part of conservation schemes. Fishers in some 
townships (eg Labutta) and some socioeconomic 
groupings (eg women) tended to focus entirely on this 
management attribute. While changes in net use for 
limited periods of time may be very effective in terms 
of hilsa conservation, any change in the status quo 
should be carefully evaluated to better understand 
the complexity of interactions between rules and 
their enforcement, markets for fishing gear, and the 
implications for fishing household livelihoods.
Creating new sanctuaries closed to fishing to assist 
spawning and juvenile growth was the most widely 
accepted management change in the hypothetical 
conservation schemes. This particularly applies to 
sanctuaries spaced at least six miles apart to avoid 
conflicts with current fishing practices, namely drift 
netting. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many 
fishers are already aware of areas closed off for fishing, 
including conservation zones. Therefore, it may be 
possible to implement this change without the need for 
much compensation. More investigation is needed to 
find out if there is consensus among fishers about the 
acceptance of sanctuaries, and what experience fishers 
have of current conservation zones. It would also be 
IIED WorkIng papEr
   www.iied.org     27
worth exploring the benefits and risks of implementing 
and managing sanctuary areas. Benefits could include 
better local awareness and stewardship and, if coupled 
with payments to fishers for conservation activity, 
improved livelihoods. Risks may include conflicts arising 
from enforcing fishing bans in these areas. 
Although the choice of compensation means and 
amounts was informed by local stakeholders, the 
results suggest that their influence in the choices 
among conservation agreements was limited. It is likely 
that this resulted in some fishers ignoring compensation 
attributes when making their choices; for example, on 
average Ngawpudaw township respondents showed 
indifference to monetary compensation. This could be 
explored through further modelling, taking this choice 
behaviour with respect to compensation into account. 
There was limited interest in rice as in-kind 
compensation. Interestingly, it was the township with 
on average better-off respondents (Maubin) that showed 
the most interest in rice as in-kind compensation, and 
there was no significant difference in response to in-kind 
compensation between male and female respondents. 
While this may be explained by the abundance of rice 
in the region, there is probably a need for a detailed 
exploration of this finding and to see if other forms of in-
kind compensation are more viable. Where this includes 
food items, it may be worth moving beyond staple food 
items towards those that are perceived to be nutritious 
and difficult to obtain in local markets.
The results also highlight the need to strengthen local 
institutions, and cooperation between institutions in 
different sectors, to address other threats to hilsa fishery 
beyond overfishing. These include harmful fishing 
techniques, water diffuse pollution from farming and 
over-dependency on fishing due to a lack of alternative 
livelihoods. Cooperation between different institutions 
and stakeholders is likely to be required to address 
issues that have different spatial dimensions and often 
span different governance levels. 
This study has appraised several management changes 
to include in an incentive-based conservation scheme 
for hilsa fish in the Ayeyarwady Delta, Myanmar. The 
findings reveal a number of promising management 
options to pursue further. However, due to the limited 
influence that changes in compensation amounts had 
on respondents’ choices, the estimates of ‘willingness 
to accept’ compensation should not be used directly 
to define the amount of compensation provided in a 
scheme. We recommend further qualitative study to 
refine the potential management changes to consider, 
and to identify appropriate in-kind and monetary 
compensation amounts. This type of study should 
also build on more in-depth ecological knowledge to 
identify the most effective management interventions 
(Bladon et al., 2019; Merayo et al., 2020), carefully 
consider income from fishery and income dependency 
over the season (Khaing et al., 2018) and provide 
additional insights from women on incentive-based 
conservation schemes. Deliberative methods may be 
particularly helpful, especially if focused on finding a 
‘fair price’ for compensation and ways to engage fishers 
in conservation efforts (Spash, 2008; Bartkowski and 
Lienhoop, 2018). 
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Appendices
Appendix 1. Choice experiment design
With five attributes (four attributes with four levels, and one attribute with two levels), the full factorial comprised 
a total of 1,024 possible combinations of attribute levels across two alternative hilsa conservation agreements 
((44 x 2)2). To reduce the number of choice tasks shown to respondents, we used a Bayesian efficient design 
specified to optimise D-error for a multinomial logit model (ChoiceMetrics, 2014) with 36 choice tasks, blocked to 
six versions so that each respondent faced six choice tasks. Dominant alternatives in choice tasks were avoided 
in the experimental design generation. We imposed restrictions to ensure that at least one of the management 
attributes required a change from the status quo in return for in-kind or monetary compensation payments. Priors 
for the Bayesian design were specified as uniform distributions with signs and boundaries based on theoretical 
expectations, pre-tests and a small pilot study in a village in the Maubin township area. We expected positive 
signs for payments (ie higher payment amounts would be preferred to lower payment amounts) and negative signs 
for management restrictions (ie respondents would prefer less over more restrictions); and a relatively greater 
compensation requirement for restrictions in required mesh size between the Burmese months of Thadingyut and 
Natdaw compared to creating sanctuaries. An example of the choice tasks is shown in Figure 2.
Appendix 2. Econometric approach
The model
Choice data is analysed using a mixed logit model in willingness to accept (WTA) space. All models are estimated 
in R using the Apollo package, Version 0.0.8 (Hess and de Palma, 2019). The mixed logit model accounts for 
heterogeneity in preferences following a statistical distribution to be specified by the analyst. In our case, we 
assume marginal willingness to accept (WTA) for non-monetary attributes to be distributed normally. The use of 
a triangular distribution for non-monetary attributes was tested but resulted in similar and qualitatively equivalent 
results. 
For the attributes related to additional closures (CLOSE), sanctuary creation (SANCT) and in-kind compensation 
(RICE), actual measurement units could be used in the model. For example, for SANCT these would be [0,3,6,9] 
referring to miles that sanctuaries would be apart. Resulting WTA estimates would then refer to a one-unit change 
to the attribute (for example, in the case of SANCT, to a 1-mile change in the distance between newly created 
sanctuary areas). We provide this model using actual measurement units for comparison for the overall sample, 
but otherwise specify coefficients to relate to discrete changes from ‘No change’ or ‘No payment’ to one of the 
attribute levels. First, this approach allows for non-linear effects in response to attributes. Second, it allows attribute 
levels that may not require compensation to be identified, or – more generally – that have not had a significant 
influence on fishers’ decisions. Both of these aspects are useful in terms of policy implications.
Detailed econometric approach
Fishers were asked to choose in a series of choice tasks between three alternatives. Two alternatives described 
conservation agreements with non-monetary attributes involving changes in hilsa management and in-kind 
compensation x, and a monetary attribute p. The third alternative referred to ‘No agreement’ and indicates 
non-participation in the conservation scheme given the offered trade-offs between management changes and 
compensation. 
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Following random utility theory, a utility function is characterised by the attributes of the experimental design in a 
linear and additive fashion, in addition to a random error term ε. The utility function U for fisher n and alternative i in 
choice task t can then be written as:
Unit = –αn pnit+ βn′ xnit+ εnit (1)
where α, β are parameters to be estimated for the payment attribute main effect and the non-monetary attribute 
main effects, respectively. The random error term ε is assumed to be identically and independently distributed (iid) 
and related to the choice probability with a Gumbel distribution with error variance Var(εni) = μn2(π2/6). μn denotes 
a respondent specific scale factor. 
By dividing equation (1) by μn, we derive a scale-free utility function with a new error term that is constant across 
respondents (Train and Weeks, 2005):
Unit = (αn/μn)pnit + (βn/μn)′xnit + εnit (2)
where εnit is iid with constant error variance π2/6. If γn = αn/μn and cn = βn/μn are parameters to be estimated, a 
model in preference space is derived (Train and Weeks 2005). Re-specification of the utility function in willingness 
to accept (WTA) space allows direct estimation of the distributions of marginal WTA for non-monetary attribute 
effects. Because marginal WTA for management changes and in-kind compensation is wn = cn/γn, the utility 
function in WTA space is:
Unit = γn pnit + (γn wn)′xnit + εnit (3)
Let the sequence of choices over Tn choice tasks for respondent n be defined as yn = (in1,in2,…,inTn). The mixed logit 
model enables estimation of heterogeneity across respondents by allowing γn and wn to deviate from the population 
means following a random distribution. The unconditional choice probability of respondent n’s sequence of choices 
(yn over Tn choice tasks) is: Pr(yn|γn,wn) = ∫∏             f(ηn│Ω)dηn (4)
where f(ηn│Ω) is the joint density of the parameter vector for cost and non-monetary attributes, [γn, wn], ηn is the 
vector comprised of the random parameters, Ω denotes the parameters of these distributions (eg the mean and 
variance). 
The integral in Equation (4) does not have a closed form and thus requires approximation through simulation 
(Train, 2003), which were based on 10,000 Sobol draws. To ensure positivity of the marginal utility of income, 
the payment attribute parameter is assumed to follow a triangular distribution with the lower bound constrained to 
equal zero. An alternative is the log-normal distribution. We opt for the triangular distribution to avoid well-known 
problems with long tails of the log-normal distribution. The marginal WTA coefficients of the remaining non-
monetary attribute effects are assumed to follow a normal distribution. An alternative specific constant (ASC) for 
the ‘No agreement’ option is also specified as a random coefficient following a normal distribution.
Tn  exp(–γnpnit + (γn wn)′xnit) 
t1=1 (∑Jj=1exp(–γn pnjt + (γn wn)′xnjt)
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Appendix 3. Model results for continuously coded 
attributes
Table A1. Model results of mixed logit model in WTA space with continuously coded non-monetary attributes
wtA eStIMAte StAndARd eRRoR
Mean
ASC_NA –1.132 0.228 **
CLOSE –0.032 0.021
NETS –0.439 0.076 **
SANCT 0.082 0.039 **
RICE 0.014 0.113
CASHa 0 NA
Standard deviation
ASC_NA 0.873 0.163 **
CLOSE 0.208 0.044 **
NETS 0.896 0.168 **
SANCT 0.266 0.085 **
RICE 0.017 0.543
CASH 0.461 0.081 **
Number of individuals 383
Number of observations 2297
LL (final) -1641.036
Rho-square (0) 0.35
Note: ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level; a fixed to zero to constrain triangular distribution to positive domain; ASC_NA 
– alternative specific constant associated with ‘No agreement’; CLOSE – fishing bans for 7, 14 or 21 days; NETS – only DoF large-
mesh nets to be used at certain periods; SANCT – juvenile hilsa sanctuaries placed every 3, 6 or 9 miles along the river; RICE – rice as 
compensation in 1, 2 or 3 tinn; CASH – money as compensation; LL – value of log-likelihood function
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Abbreviations and 
acronyms
ASC  alternative specific constant
DoF  Department of Fisheries
FDA Fisher Development Association
IIED International Institute for Environment and Development
MMK Myanmar kyat 
NAG  Network Activities Group
SRUC Scotland’s Rural College
WTA  willingness to accept
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This study provides key insights for the development of 
incentive-based conservation schemes for hilsa in Myanmar’s 
Ayeyarwady Delta. The results of a choice experiment 
suggest on average a willingness to participate in such 
conservation schemes. Some potential management options 
for conservation schemes such as additional closed fishing 
periods and creation of new sanctuaries are more widely 
accepted than restrictions in net use. We recommend further 
studies to refine management options and identify appropriate 
compensation mechanisms that take into account improved 
ecological knowledge and carefully consider income 
dependencies and gender disparities along the supply chain. 
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